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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UCA § 78-2-2(3)(j), as
amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Regarding Plaintiff/Appellant Stone Flood and Fire, Inc.: Did the trial

court incorrectly rule that the statute of limitations barred appellant Stone Flood and
Fire's claims as a matter of law?
Standard of Review:

"The applicability of a statute of limitations and the

applicability of the discovery rule are questions of law, which we review for correctness."
Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, f 18, 108 P.3d 741, 745.
Preservation: This issue was raised below in the parties' briefing at R. 109-231,
313-321, 829-836, 935-940, and in the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on All Claims, R. 929-933, Tentative Ruling
For Hearing Feb. 5, 2010, R. 949-968, and Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and
Dismissing All Remaining Claims, R. 973-974.
2.

Regarding Appellants James and Patrice Stone:

Did the trial court

incorrectly rule that James and Patrice lacked standing to bring claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing?
Standard of Review:

"[F]or standing, we review legal determinations for

correctness, affording deference for 'factual determinations that bear upon the question of
standing,' but minimal deference to the district court's application of the facts to the law."
1

Cedar Mountain Envtl, Inc. v. Tooele County ex rel Tooele County Comm'n, 2009 UT
48, \ 7, 214 P.3d 95 (quoting Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, U 10, 154 P.3d 808).
Preservation: This issue was raised in the parties' briefing at R. 109-231, 313-321,
323-331, and in the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment on All Claims, R. 929-933, Tentative Ruling For Hearing Feb. 5,
2010, R. 949-968, and Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and Dismissing All
Remaining Claims, R. 973-974.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313: Limitations of actions.
(1)

An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance must be
commenced within three years after the inception of the loss.

(2)

Except as provided in Subsection (1) or elsewhere in this title, the law
applicable to limitation of actions in Title 78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of
Limitations, applies to actions on insurance policies.

(3)

An insurance policy may not:
(a)
(b)
(c)

(4)

limit the time for beginning an action on the policy to a time less
than that authorized by statute;
prescribe in what court an action may be brought on the policy; or
provide that no action may be brought, subject to permissible
arbitration provisions in contracts.

Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the complainant
will arise from a delay in bringing suit against an insurer, which prejudice
is other than the delay itself, no action may be brought against an insurer on
an insurance policy to compel payment under the policy until the earlier of:
(a)
(b)
(c)

60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as required under the
policy;
waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or
the insurer's denial of full payment.
2

(5)

The period of limitation is tolled during the period in which the parties
conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance
policy, by law, or as agreed to by the parties.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-112:
The duration of an injunction or statutory prohibition which delays the filing of an
action may not be counted as part of the statute of limitations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below
This case arises out of a major fire that occurred on November 16-17, 2000, and
the alleged failure of defendant/appellee Safeco Insurance Company of America
("Safeco") to timely and adequately make payments under an insurance policy.
Appellants allege that, as a result, Stone Flood and Fire Restoration, Inc. ("Stone Flood"),
a thriving business before the fire, became bankrupt. James and Patrice Stone ("James
and Patrice" or "the Stones"), sole owners of the business, infused hundreds of thousands
of dollars of their personal money into the business trying to keep it afloat during the
dispute with Safeco, but to no avail. The Stones were left with hundreds of thousands of
dollars of debt, damaged reputations due to Safeco's early accusations of arson, stressrelated health problems, and other consequential damages.
Stone Flood initially filed suit on November 15, 2002 (Stone Flood Suit I). (R.
163, 295.) On February 3, 2003, Safeco invoked an appraisal provision in the insurance
policy, giving notice to Stone Flood of its election to have the loss appraised. (R. 667.)
Although Stone Flood had not objected to Safeco's invocation of the appraisal procedure,
Safeco subsequently filed a motion with the trial court to compel an appraisal. (R. 666-
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669; 672-673.) The court granted the unopposed motion on July 11, 2003. (R. 166.) For
various reasons, the appraisers did not issue their initial decision until January 9, 2007.
(R. 173-177.) Because of the length of the appraisal process, the court had dismissed
without prejudice Stone Flood Suit I for lack of prosecution. (R. 171; 297.)
For a few months following the appraiser's initial decision, the parties
unsuccessfully explored settlement. (R. 289; 676-677; 191; R 1020, p. 13-15; 408.)
Stone Flood then re-filed its lawsuit on May 22, 2007 (Stone Flood Suit II). (R. 1-9.)
Separate from Stone Flood Suit I, James and Patrice Stone filed a personal lawsuit
against Safeco on November 17, 2003 (Stones Suit I), alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress and breach of good faith duties. (R. 287; 408.) Counsel for both sides
stipulated to stay these claims pending the appraisal process and agreed that the statute of
limitations would be tolled. (R. 287; 680; 687-689.) Thereafter, on September 16, 2005,
the court dismissed without prejudice the Stones Suit I for lack of prosecution. (R. 171.)
On September 17, 2007, James and Patrice re-filed their personal claims against Safeco
by joining the Stone Flood Suit II. (R. 12-19.)
More than two years into the current litigation, Safeco argued that the claims of
Stone Flood, James and Patrice are barred by the statute of limitations. Safeco also raised
various other arguments in seeking summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims. (R. 109160.)
In a ruling issued November 3, 2009, the trial court granted in part and denied in
part Safeco's motion for summary judgment on the Stones' personal claims, initially
ruling that: (a) an issue of fact existed regarding whether the statute of limitations had run
4

on James and Patrice's claims, and (b) sufficient evidence existed to support the Stones'
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (R. 929-933.)
Upon further consideration, the trial court issued a memorandum decision on
January 26, 2010, modifying his prior ruling and holding that, regardless of the issues of
fact previously identified, James and Patrice lacked standing to sue Safeco personally
under the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Stocks v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 3 P.3d 722, 2000 UT App 139. (R. 949-968.) The court then issued its
final order, dismissing all claims of Stone Flood and James and Patrice on February 5,
2010. (R. 973-974.)
The trial court further ruled that, as a matter of law, the statute of limitations on all
of Stone Flood's claims had expired a few days before the filing of Stone Flood Suit II.
(R. 930-931.)
Stone Flood and the Stones timely appealed. (R. 1018.)
Statement of facts
A.

General Overview

Stone Flood and James and Patrice purchased a comprehensive business policy
that provided, among other coverages, "business interruption" and "additional expense"
coverages which are designed to financially protect a business during the critical business
interruption period following a catastrophe.

After a major fire (which occurred on

November 16-17, 2000) that burned the Stones' business location, the Stones were faced
with a significant decline in revenue, substantial increases in overhead and expenses, and
the inability to resume business operations.

5

Rather than making timely payments under the business interruption coverages,
Safeco made unfounded accusations of arson against James and Patrice and did not make
its first payment for loss of income until approximately three and one-half months after
the fire, during which time the Stones were unable to meet payroll and other overhead
expenses. Due to the financial distress, the Stones laid off numerous employees and
downsized operations, which in turn resulted in diminished work, damaged business
relationships and lost opportunities. James and Patrice tried to shore up the business by
infusing hundreds of thousands of dollars of their personal money into the company
while waiting for Safeco's promised payments. Though Safeco eventually paid all of its
policy limits over a period of seven years, the initial payments were grossly inadequate
and very delinquent. Stone Flood could not recover and by 2005, it was out of business.
B.

Background

James and Patrice Stone ("James and Patrice") were the owners of Stone Flood
and Fire Restoration, Inc. during all relevant times. Since 1983, James and Patrice had
been successfully involved in the restoration business through different companies, which
evolved over time.

In 2000, the name of their business was Stone Flood and Fire

Restoration, Inc ("Stone Flood"). (R. 261-262; 378, p.8-9; 394, p. 18-19; 618-619, ffll 26.)1
To expand their business opportunities, Stone Flood took out an SBA loan in
August 2000 in the amount of $750,000, which was guaranteed by James and Patrice.

1

In its reply memorandum, Safeco did not respond to nor contest any of the Stones'
statement of facts. (R. 731-759).
6

Stone Flood was profitable every month from its inception until the time of the fire on
November 17, 2000. Its clientele continued to grow, and it was considered along with
Utah Disaster Kleenup as one of the two best restoration companies in Utah. It was
meeting all of its obligations and overhead, and there were no financial difficulties. (R.
263; 619-620,ffi[7-8.)
C.

The Fire

A fire began during the late evening of Thursday, November 16, 2000, and
continued into the morning of November 17, 2000. The fire burned nearly all of Stone
Flood's office and restoration equipment (including the computers which contained their
financial data), supplies, inventory, and vehicles that were stored in the building, and
some personal property owned separately by James and Patrice.

It also burned

approximately $40,000 of revenue checks that had been recently received but not yet
deposited. (R. 264-265; 620-621, ^ 9-11, 13; 270.)
D.

The Safeco Insurance Policy

The Safeco insurance policy issued to Stone Flood was a comprehensive
commercial policy that included coverage for losses caused by a fire, including damage
to the building, loss of personal property (including personal property of James and
Patrice), business income loss and extra expenses incurred from the date of the fire until
the restoration was complete and operations had returned to normal. (R. 265-268; 335375.)
Safeco's policy has a provision for appraisal, should the parties be unable to agree
on the amount of the loss. The provision reads:
7

If we and you disagree on the amount of Net Income and operating
expenses or the amount of loss, either may make written demand for an
appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will select a competent and
impartial appraiser.
The two appraisers will select an umpire. If they cannot agree, either may
request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction.
The appraisers will state separately the amount of Net Income and
operating expense or amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit
their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will be
binding...."
(R. 268; 343.)
E.

Safeco's Handling of the Claim

On November 17, 2000, the Stones gave notice of the fire to Safeco. A Safeco
adjuster came to the scene and explained to the Stones the business interruption insurance
and other coverages that would help get them financially through the difficult time when
they couldn't conduct their business. The Stones expressed an urgent need for money to
help make payroll and pay other overhead and operating expenses. The Safeco adjuster
told the Stones, "That's why you have this insurance," and agreed to start making
payments immediately. (R. 269-270; 621-622, fflj 12-13; 634-635, ffi[ 9-10; 384, pp. 7880.)
The adjuster insisted that the Stones (who were in the restoration business)
perform the clean-up, demolition and restoration work, for which he said Safeco would
immediately pay. Relying thereon, the Stones pulled their employees from good paying
jobs and performed the restoration at their burned location, however, Safeco later refused
to pay for all of the work. (R. 270; 622-623, f 18; 636, % 15.)
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Within a few days of the fire, the city and state fire marshals had concluded that
the origin of the fire was electrical and accidental.

Around the same time, a fire

investigator retained by Farmers Insurance, the insurer of the building owner, reached the
same conclusion. Safeco, however, appeared determined to establish arson. (R. 270-271;
622, H 14; 653-654; 656-659; 661-662.)
Instead of making the promised payments, Safeco began to accuse the Stones of
setting the fire themselves. The Stones' employees were interrogated and told that, "the
Stones have done this before," for which there was no supporting evidence.

There was

even media coverage originating with Safeco that the Stones may have engaged in arson.
No one besides Safeco alleged arson. Over a period of many months, the Safeco adjuster
made accusatory remarks about the Stones, threatening that if Safeco could prove arson,
the Stones would have to pay back any advanced payments. (R. 271-272; 622, ^} 16-17;
399, pp. 98-100; 429-430, pp. 124-128; 417, p. 178.)
The Stones' business operations diminished rapidly. Safeco demanded copies of
extensive financial records, but nearly all of the Stone's financial and other internal
records had been destroyed in the fire. (R. 272-273; 623, If 19; 636-637, If 16; 412-413,
pp. 56-59; 431, pp. 140-141.)
In December, Safeco indicated that it was willing to advance $25,000 on the
condition that James and Patrice signed a non-waiver agreement, wherein they would be
The only evidence that could have possibly supported this false accusation was the
fact that years earlier, James' estranged brother had committed arson. James was the one
who turned his brother in, and helped law enforcement prosecute his brother. James was
never a suspect. Neither James nor Patrice has ever been involved in a fire and/or any
event involving alleged arson. (R. 272.)
9

personally liable to repay any amounts advanced if Safeco later determined there was no
coverage. (R. 664.) Being desperate, James and Patrice signed. However, this amount
was grossly inadequate. With approximately 80 to 100 employees, payroll alone every
15 days was approximately $125,000. Stone Flood had no choice but to start laying off
employees which it did, starting just before Christmas 2000. (R. 273-274; 623-624, fflj
20-22; 431, p. 139.)
James and Patrice made heroic efforts to save the business by infusing hundreds of
thousands of dollars of their own personal funds into the business. They borrowed
against their life insurance policies (which they later lost). They used funds set aside for
their retirement, borrowed against their home, used their personal savings, and
consolidated their operations by closing Stone Flood's other offices in Dallas and Salt
Lake City. They had James' father, Conrad Stone, borrow against his own home and
give the proceeds to James and Patrice for Stone Flood's use. James and Patrice had
personally guaranteed many of Stone Floods obligations. Stone Flood finally went out of
business in 2004, leaving the Stones with hundreds of thousands of dollars of personal
indebtedness and a ruined credit rating. All of these circumstances were known by
Safeco, who seemed indifferent to these adverse effects. (R. 280; 627-628, ^f 37; 642643, f 36-37; 391, p. 160; 475-476, pp. 145-146; 513, H 20.)
These events took a heavy toll on Patrice Stone's health. She could not sleep, and
was experienced panic and anxiety attacks. She sought medical treatment with doctors
and counseling, and began taking anti-depressants and sleeping medications. She was
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taken to the emergency room on more than one occasion with stress symptoms similar to
a heart attack. (R. 281; 628, ^ 38; 390, p. 142-143; 397, pp. 85-88.)
There was ample evidence that had Safeco made timely payments, Stone Flood
would have survived and continued successfully. (R. 281; 420, p. 222; 505-506; 627, *j|
35; 642, % 34.)
F.

Facts Regarding the Stone's Lawsuits and Appraisal
Stone Flood Suit I (Provo)

On November 15, 2002, Stone Flood filed a Complaint in the Fourth Judicial
District Court against defendant Safeco, alleging wrongful conduct and seeking benefits,
consequential damages and punitive damages. After answering the complaint, Safeco
exercised its right under the insurance policy to have the fire loss determined by
Appraisal in a letter dated February 3, 2003 ("the Appraisal").
Though Stone Flood did not object, on April 3, 2003, Safeco filed a Motion to
Submit to Arbitration/Appraisal and Stay Proceedings. Stone Flood did not resist the
motion, and on July 11, 2003, the court issued an order staying the proceedings pending
the Appraisal. The court ultimately dismissed Stone Flood Suit I for failure to prosecute
on September 16, 2005. (R. 285-286; 168-171; 666-669; 672-673; 166.)
Appraisal Process
Consistent with the Policy provision (R. 343), the parties selected two appraisers
to determine the loss.

On January 9, 2007, the two appraisers issued written

The policy states, "If they fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the
umpire [third appraiser]." See p. 7 above.
11

opinions describing each item where they agreed and where they disagreed. Since there
were disagreements between the two appraisers, the Appraisal process had not yet been
concluded, however, as appraisers they did nothing further because Stone Flood refiled its
lawsuit4 (R. 286; 408; 173-177.)
The Stones' Suit I
Retaining new counsel, James and Patrice filed a lawsuit against Safeco on
November 17, 2003 ("the Stones' Suit I").

In early January, 2004, James and Patrice

proposed a stipulation to: (a) consolidate Stone Flood Suit I and the Stones' Suit I, and (b)
enlarge the Appraisal process to include all of the Stones in both actions.

Safeco's

counsel initially agreed to consolidate the two cases, but wanted to further consider
enlarging the Appraisal proceeding. (R. 287-288; 676-677; 685; 680.)
On May 26, 2004, defense counsel responded that he had authority to consolidate
the "Appraisal process for the two (2) pending cases. I would propose that we file a joint
motion to stay the most recently filed case and have our clients agree that the Appraisal
process will include the amounts being claimed by all Plaintiffs." (R. 680.) (emphasis
added).
A stipulation was signed by defense counsel, the pertinent part of which states:
The parties believe it is in the best interest of everyone, and is most judicially
efficient, to pursue Appraisal to determine the amount of insurance benefits owing

Because of the huge expense to employ the appraisers, the parties stipulated that
each could use its own appraiser as an economic expert in the litigation. (R. 289, \ 69;
408.)
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under the policy. These amounts must first be determined, in any event, before
plaintiffs' [James and Patrice] other claims may be adjudicated.
The parties stipulate that the Court should enter an order staying these
proceedings [James' and Patrice's lawsuit] while the parties pursue the Appraisal
process.
The parties further stipulate that the claims of plaintiffs, James K. Stone
and Patrice Stone, may be dismissed without prejudice. The claims of these two
plaintiffs may be refiled, in the event that plaintiffs' counsel discovers evidence
that they are insureds under the defendant's insurance policy. It is intended that
the statute of limitations be tolled as it relates to these dismissed claims until
discovery is completed,
(Emphasis added). (R. 687-689.) Fact discovery was not completed until May 22, 2009.
(R. 99.)5
Counsel for both parties agreed that nothing further would be done until the
Appraisal was completed, after which the parties would attempt to negotiate a settlement
of any remaining issues.

All of this was with the expressed intent to have a complete

arrest of all litigation, which meant the lawsuits might be dismissed without prejudice.
(R. 288, TJ 67; 676-677; 680; 687-689; 693-695; 1020, pp. 13-15; 1021, pp. 69-71.)
Stone Flood Suit II
Shortly after the January 9, 2007, Appraisal letter, counsel for each party discussed
resolving the case through settlement rather than further pursuing Appraisal or a lawsuit.
Settlement discussions took place, but the negotiations over the next few months did not
offer much optimism for success. (R. 289; 676-677; 191; R 1020, p. 13-15; 408.)

The trial court found this tolling agreement to be "hopelessly ambiguous." (R. 1020, p.
28.)
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Stone Flood filed its second lawsuit on May 22, 2007 (Stone Flood Suit II) and the
complaint was later amended to add James and Patrice on September, 17, 2007. (R. 1219.) At the close of discovery, Safeco moved for summary judgment, which the trial
court ultimately granted, as described above. This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's erred in ruling as a matter of law that Stone Flood missed the
statute of limitations in its re-filed lawsuit by three days. The court first erred in
concluding that the "inception of the loss" for purposes of the statute was the day of the
fire, November 16-17, 2000.

Particularly in the context of bad faith, the court's

definition means that the statute of limitations began running before a cause of action
even existed, contrary to longstanding principles of law.
Moreover, this Court's earlier decision in Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 P.3d 947 suggests that a more appropriate reading of the statute is
that inception of the loss for purposes of the statute of limitations occurs only after one of
the prerequisites to filing suit has taken place. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21313(4) "prohibits filing an action until, among other things, the insurer denies full
payment." In this case, none of those triggering events occurred within three days of the
fire.
The court next erred in declining to deduct from its calculation the 60 days during
which insureds are prohibited from filing suit under Section 31A-21-313(4). Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-2-112 states that the duration of any "statutory prohibition which delays the
filing of an action may not be counted as part of the statute of limitations." The trial
14

court erroneously assumed that this provision does not apply to first-party insurance
claims, but the language of the statute does not support the court's assumption.
Additionally, regardless of whether Section 78B-2-112 applies, if the insurance statute of
limitations is interpreted consistent with well-settled common law principles, by
operation of law the 60 days would not be counted. Applying a tolling provision does not
contravene or conflict with a statute of limitations; it merely defines certain days that are
not counted when applying the statute.
The court next erred in ruling that statutory tolling of the limitations period during
the appraisal process did not commence upon Safeco's written demand for appraisal
under the policy, but instead only commenced when an uncontested court order for
appraisal was entered five months later.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(5),

statutes of limitations are automatically tolled "during the period in which the parties
conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance policy . . . ."
The procedure prescribed by the policy triggered the appraisal process through the
sending of a written demand, which occurred on February 3, 2003. The fact that Safeco
later filed an uncontested motion and obtained a superfluous court order could not serve
to rewrite the policy's own provision for commencing the appraisal procedure.
Finally, the court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Stone Flood's claims were
not encompassed within a tolling agreement entered into between the parties' counsel.
The court found that the tolling agreement itself was "hopelessly ambiguous," yet
concluded as a matter of law that it covered by the Stones individually, and not Stone
Flood. That finding, however, ignores correspondence between the parties' counsel
15

expressly mentioning that the lawsuits by both parties would be put on hold. The trial
court's conclusion that Stone Flood is nonetheless excluded from the agreement because
such an agreement would have been unnecessary to protect its rights is not a legal or
realistic approach to contracts: Contracts are enforceable regardless of whether they state
the obvious or confer entirely new rights.
With respect to the claims of James and Patrice Stone, the trial court erred in
reluctantly finding that it was obligated to dismiss those claims for lack of standing.
First, Safeco appears to have treated or recognized the Stones as insureds, for example,
by requiring them to personally guarantee reimbursement of payments made by Safeco to
the corporation, which it could not legally have forced them to do if they were not
insureds.
Additionally, the very fact that Safeco imposed such requirements on the Stones
shows why claims by shareholders in closely held corporations should not be subject to
the usual rule that shareholders may not assert a claim for breach of duty to a corporation.
Safeco would never have asked passive investors in IBM to personally guarantee
repayment of benefits paid to the company; it recognized a difference with a small
company with two known, active shareholders.
The trial court also acknowledged this distinction, but erroneously believed that it
was compelled by the Court of Appeals decision in Stocks v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. to dismiss the Stones' claims. First, the court's ruling overlooked the fact that the
Stones' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and bad faith alleged the
breach of independent duties owed to them. Second, the court failed to take into account
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the fact that Safeco's actions rendered the Stones individually liable on personal
guarantees, and imposed statutory liability on them. Finally, unlike a typical corporate
scenario, Safeco was fully aware of, and disregarded, the harm being done to the Stones
personally as a result of its actions toward the corporation.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CALCULATED THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON STONE FLOOD'S CLAIMS, OR
AN ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS IN THAT REGARD.

In its motion for summary judgment, Safeco argued that Stone Flood's claims are
barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21313(1) ("An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance must be
commenced within three years after the inception of the loss.")- The statute of limitations
is an affirmative defense upon which Safeco bore the burden of proof. Barnard & Burk
Group, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 401, If 13, 122 P.3d 700.
The trial court granted Safeco's motion, dismissing Stone Flood's claims. The
trial court's ruling was based upon several subsidiary rulings, all of which must be
correct as a matter of law for the court's calculation to stand. Specifically, the court
concluded or assumed: (1) That "the inception of the loss" for purposes of the three-year
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) was November 16-17, 2000;
(2) that the statutory bar against filing suit against an insurer within 60 days of proof of
loss or denial of payment did not toll the limitation period; (3) that statutory tolling
during the appraisal process did not commence upon Safeco's written demand for
appraisal under the policy; and (4) that Stone Flood's claims were not encompassed
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within a tolling agreement entered into between appellants' counsel and Safeco's
(former) counsel.
Based upon these underlying determinations, the trial court concluded that Stone
Flood missed the statute of limitations in its refiling by three days. (With a three-year
statute of limitations, a claim must be filed within 1095 days. The trial court concluded
that, based upon its rulings and assumptions, 1098 days lapsed before the re-filing. See
R. 1020, p. 4.)
Because the trial court concluded that Stone Flood missed the statute by only three
days, any error or question of fact as to any of the subsidiary rulings compels reversal of
the summary judgment. As discussed below, Stone Flood believes that the trial court
erred in each of the subsidiary rulings as a matter of law.
A,

The "inception of the loss" was not November 16-17, 2000, but
when Stone Flood knew or should have known that Safeco
would not honor its obligations under the policy.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-313(l) provides that, "An action on a written policy or
contract of first party insurance must be commenced within three years after the inception
of the loss." The trial court ruled that "the inception of the loss occurred on November
16-17, 2000, the date of the catastrophic fire in Stone Flood's building[.]" Accordingly,
the court found as a baseline that "the plaintiffs would have had to file their claim prior to
November 17, 2003 in order to be timely under §31A-21-313." (R. 960, 962.)6

6

In a case where the statute was allegedly missed by 3 days, it warrants noting that the
limitation period would run from when the fire was extinguished (November 17), rather
than when it began (November 16). See, e.g., Johns v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 66
Misc.2d 799, 322 N.Y.S.2d 324 (more persuasive argument is that statute of limitations
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No Utah court has defined the term "inception of the loss" in the context of bad
faith. See e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 797-798 n. 8 (Utah 1991)
(indicating that the Court had not yet addressed whether the "time for bringing an action
for [a breach of implied duties of good faith and fair dealing] runs from the date of the
harm caused by the breach of the covenant or from the date of the event triggering the
insured's alleged liability on the policy").
Appellants respectfully submit that, in this context, "inception of the loss" for
purposes of Section 31A-21-313(1) means when bad faith is alleged to have first
occurred. Under any other reading, the statute of limitations would be running on a claim
that did not even exist yet. Conceivably, in a complex case taking years to adjust, the
statute of limitations could even expire before a cause of action had arisen at all.
The interpretation urged herein is more consistent with the body of law generally
recognizing that a cause of action accrues, and the relevant statute of limitations begins to
run, only upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.
Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) (internal

would run from when the fire was extinguished; often it is not known when a
conflagration started, whereas extinguishment is generally ascertainable from fire
department records; "Certainly, an insured can have no idea of even the gross extent of
his loss until after the fire has run its course."); see also Wood v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
21 F.3d 741, 743-744 (7th Cir. 2003) ("date of loss" limitation in policy is ambiguous
"when a fire burns over more than one day," and would be construed as meaning the date
on which the fire was extinguished). Presumably for these reasons, Safeco represented to
the Stones throughout the adjustment process that it considered the date of loss to be
November 17. See (R. 682) (checks from Safeco to Stone Flood identifying date of loss
as 11-17-00), and also (R. 24) Safeco's Answer to Amended Complaint, \ 6 (admitting
that fire was on November 17, 2000).
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quotations omitted); see also Canadian Indemnity Co. v.K &Tf Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661,
663 (D. Utah 1990) ("As early as 1927, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that c[t]he
statutes of limitation do not begin to run until a suit or cause of action exists,'" citing
Kimball v. McCornick, 259 P. 313, 317 (Utah 1927)).
This reading is also consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-314, which
prohibits insurers from issuing any insurance policy containing any provision "limiting
the right of action against the insurer to less than three years from the date the cause of
action accrues." (Emphasis added.)
Stone Flood's interpretation further harmonizes two separate components of the
statute of limitations, Section 31A-21-313(1) (the three year limitation) and Section 31A21-313(4) (an initial 60-day bar on filing suit). In this respect, this Court's opinion in
Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 P.3d 947 may be informative.
At issue in Tucker was whether a claim for additional automobile accident-related
Personal Injury Protection benefits was time-barred under Section 31A-21-313(1). In
ruling that it was, the Court first defined the term "inception of the loss" as referring "to
the time when the loss was first incurred or began to accrue."

Id. at ^f 15 (citing

Canadian Indemnity Co. v. K &T, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661, 664 (D. Utah 1990)). The
Court then noted that, under the same statute of limitations, "section 31A-21-313(4)
prohibits filing an action until, among other things, the insurer denies full payment." Id.
The statute referenced by the Court, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(4), provides:
Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the complainant will
arise from a delay in bringing suit against an insurer, which prejudice is other than
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the delay itself, no action may be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy
to compel payment under the policy until the earlier of:
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as required under the policy;
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment.
Applying that subsection to the alleged failure to pay PIP benefits, Tucker
concluded that inception of the loss occurred "no later than the date on which the insurer
refuses to pay the disputed PIP benefits, and such refusal to pay constitutes denial of full
payment under § 31A-21-313(4)(c)." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Court noted
that "State Farm reimbursed the Tuckers in November 1996 for the expenses it deemed to
be necessary and informed the Tuckers that it would not reimburse the denied expenses
unless the Tuckers could submit additional medical documentation showing the expenses
were medically necessary." Tucker, 2002 UT 54, f 16. The Tuckers' lawsuit, filed more
than three years after that denial, was too late, the Court concluded.
In contrast to the approach taken in Tucker, the trial court here deemed irrelevant
when the suit could have been filed under Section 31A-21-313(4) (i.e., when was Day 61
following proof of loss, and/or after the Stones were on notice that Safeco was not paying
what was owed under the policy).
The trial court expressed concern that the "triggering events" identified in Section
31A-2-313(4) for the filing of suit "could conceivably occur well outside of the three year
The trial court assumes that "the complainant could easily file a verified complaint
alleging prejudice, thereby waiving such limitations [the 60-day bar]." (R. 961.) But that
assumption is far from clear - the statute expressly precludes a claimant from attempting
this method of avoiding the bar by if the alleged prejudice is "the delay itself." Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(4). The trial court's reading could, for all practical purposes,
render the 60-day bar meaningless.
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time period after the inception of the loss." (R. 961.) Frankly, it is difficult to imagine a
scenario in which the first proof of loss after an event would be filed more than three
years later. (Most policies require submission of proofs much sooner, for example). In
any event, under the court's ruling, the exact same could be said of an insurer's bad faith:
Literally, an insurer would be free to commit bad faith with impunity at any point three
years beyond the date of a fire or other calamity. No explanation has been provided for
why the legislature would have intended such an anomalous result.8
Because of its ruling in this case, the trial court did not require Safeco to establish
when proof of loss was submitted, or when the Stones were placed on notice, actual or
constructive, that Safeco was not going to pay as required by the policy. Safeco argued,
however, that the Stones were on notice from the very day of the fire, citing a statement
by Mrs. Stone on that day that the business had an "immediate need for cash" for payroll
and suppliers. (See R. 867.)
While Mrs. Stone's statement would hardly seem to satisfy Safeco's burden of
proof of as a matter of law, in order to even make the argument, Safeco had to leave out

The trial court cited Canadian Indemnity Co., supra, in support of its ruling. But that
case, unlike Tucker, did not address or reconcile the 60-day bar against filing suit found
in the same section of the insurance code. Moreover, Canadian Indemnity actually seems
to support the Stones' interpretation. Although the opinion is not clear, it appears that an
argument was made that the statute of limitations began to run before the insured had
suffered any actual harm from the alleged wrongful denial of a defense. The district
court ruled that the limitation period did not begin to run when the underlying lawsuit
was filed, or the defense was denied, or the legal expenses were incurred, but only when
the insured actually suffered a loss (payment of the bills) - in other words, when the last
element necessary for a cause of action to accrue actually occurred. See id. at 664-665.
That is not inconsistent with the Stones' position in this case.
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three key words from its quotation. Considering that Stone Flood is alleged to have
missed the statute by only three days, it is significant that Mrs. Stone's actual statement
on November 17 was that they had an "immediate need for cash to help make payroll that
was due in three days and to meet other overhead expenses . . . ." {See R. 269 from Pis'
Statement of Facts, ^ 15 (emphasis added).) Under Safeco's own argument, therefore,
the inception of the loss - the failure to pay - would not have occurred until at least three
days later, when payroll came and went without help from Safeco. Accordingly, the
statute would not have begun to run until then, and Stone Flood's re-filing was timely.
B.

The 60-day bar against filing suit tolled the limitation period by
operation of law.

As noted above, an insured cannot file suit against an insurance company until 60
days after the occurrence of one or more triggering events. See pp. 20-21, supra. In
calculating the three year limitation period, this 60-day filing bar should be excluded,
both by statute and by common law.
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-1129

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-112 states: "The duration of an injunction or statutory
prohibition which delays the filing of an action may not be counted as part of the statute

Because the language of the statute has not changed during the relevant period,
appellants cite to the current statute herein.
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of limitations." By its express language, this provision would require the court to
subtract the first 60 days after the fire from calculation of the limitation period.10
The trial court concluded, however, that Section 78B-2-112 has no bearing on
Section 31 A-21-313(1) (the three-year statute of limitations) because the immediately
following section, 31A-21-313(2), states, "Except as provided in Subsection (1) or
elsewhere in this title, the law applicable to limitation of actions in Title 78B, Chapter 2,
Statutes of Limitations, applies to actions on insurance policies." (R. 963.)
According to the trial court, this language bars the application of all provisions of
Title 78B, Section 2 to claims governed by the limitation period in Section 31A-21313(1) {i.e., first-party insurance claims). The court's ruling states: "Thus, under the
plain meaning of §31 A-21-313(2), any law applicable to the limitations of actions in Title
78B only applies if §31 A-21-313(1) does not") (R. 963(emphasis in original)).
With respect, that is not what Section 31 A-21-313(2) actually says. It states that
the provisions of Title 78B, Chapter 2, apply "except as provided in Subsection (1)"
(emphasis added). By its terms, therefore, the only instance in which a provision of Title
78B-2 does not apply is when it conflicts with something expressly provided in
Subsection (1). One obvious example would be Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309, which
specifies a limitation period of six years for actions on a written contract. That would
conflict with the three-year period prescribed in Section 31 A-21-313(1).

Because the filing was timely either way, Stone Flood assumes for this discussion that
proof of loss was submitted to Safeco, and/or that Safeco denied full payment, on the
very day of the fire, thus starting the 60-day clock on November 17, 2000.
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By contrast, there is nothing in Section 31A-21-313(1) that conflicts with
application of other provisions of Title 78B-2. Unlike provisions found elsewhere in the
code, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) does not contain language barring the application
of tolling provisions. See, by contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(3) ("The limitations
in this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability
under Section 78B-2-108 or any other provision of the law.").
Under the trial court's conclusion that none of the provisions of Title 78B-2 can
ever apply to first-party insurance claims, the statute of limitations on such claims would
run regardless of minority or disability (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-108, -109, -110).
Claims that are time-barred in another state would no longer be automatically barred in
Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-103). The savings statute would not apply (Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-2-111). Governmental insureds would not be held to the same limitation
periods as private parties (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-115).
None of the foregoing provisions conflicts with any provision of Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-21-313(1), yet under the trial court's broad reading of Section 31A-21-313(2),
they automatically have no application to claims under an insurance contract. Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-2-112 similarly does not conflict with Section 313(1). It does not specify a
different statute of limitations; it merely defines certain periods of time that are not to be
counted when applying the existing three-year limitation.
If the trial court's reading is correct, the filing of an action could be delayed
because of an insurer's bankruptcy, or a policy provision prohibiting suit within an initial
period of time, or an injunction, or any number of other legal prohibitions, and yet the
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statute of limitations would be running the whole time.

With respect, that is not a

reasonable interpretation of the law.
An additional difficulty with the trial court's refusal to apply Section 78B-2-112 in
this case is that the court erroneously perceived that a "conflict" exists "between section
31A-21-313(1) and section 31A-21-313(4)." (R. 960.) As noted earlier, there is no
conflict:

Three years still remains the statute of limitations, and insureds are still

prohibited from filing suit within the first 60 days. Neither tramps the other; the statutes
are fully harmonized by simply excluding the 60 days from the three-year period.
Indeed, it is the trial court's reading that actually creates a conflict - it changes Section
31A-21-313(1) from a three-year limitation period to a two-year and 10-month limitation
period.
2.

Common law

In any event, the trial court erroneously disregarded Stone Flood's alternative
argument that, regardless of whether Section 78B-2-112 applies, the three-year statute of
limitations in Section 31A-21-313(1) is tolled when interpreted consistent with common
law principles. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (adopting common law of England as
the rule of decision in all courts of this state, as long as it is not in conflict with the
constitution or laws of the state).
It has long been recognized in this country that, as "nothing more than common
justice" and "well supported by authorities,"
whenever a person is prevented from exercising his legal remedy by some
paramount authority, the time during which he is thus prevented is not to be
counted against him in determining whether the statute of limitations has barred
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his right, even though the statute makes no specific exception in his favor in such
cases.
State ex rel Brown v. Scottish American Mortgage Co., I l l Miss. 98, 71 So. 291 (1916),
quoting St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Olson, 87 Minn. 117, 91 N.W. 294, citing, inter alia, Braun v.
Sauerwein, 77 U.S. 218, 10 Wall. 218 (1870) (describing history of rule in state courts
that, "when the [plaintiff] has been disabled to sue, by a superior power, without any
default of his own . . . that unless the statutes cease to run during the continuance of the
supervening disability, he is deprived of a portion of the time within which the law
contemplated he might sue"); 51 AM. JUR. 2 D Limitation of Actions § 170 ("most courts
recognized a limited class of exceptions [tolling statutes of limitations] arising from
necessity, as in the case of inability to bring suit or to exercise one's remedy"); 54 CJ.S.
Limitations of Actions § 156 ("where one is prevented from suing by some paramount
authority, the running of the statute of limitations may be tolled and the time during
which the plaintiff is thus precluded from exercising his or her legal remedy is not to be
counted against him or her in determining whether the applicable statute of limitations
has barred the plaintiffs right of action"); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corporation of
America, 500 A.2d 1357, 1363-1365 (Del. Super. 1985) (analyzing history of general rule
suspending statute of limitations during period in which plaintiff is precluded from filing
suit).
The trial court appeared to recognize this concept, but stated: "While it is true that
many courts, including Utah, agree with such a policy as a general principle, the
application of that principle cannot be used, as plaintiffs suggest here, to contravene the
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express language of a statute, nor have plaintiffs cited any case law which persuades the
court that such an application of this principle is warranted in the instant case." (R. 962.)
As noted above, however, the application of tolling principles does not
"contravene" a statute of limitations. The limitation period remains fully in force; it is
simply the method of calculating that period that is affected.

By the trial court's

definition, all of the unanimous cases and authorities cited by Stone Flood "contravene"
statutes of limitations, yet courts have consistently so held.
At a minimum, therefore, the first 60 days after the fire should not have counted
toward the three-year limitation period, regardless of any other calculation issues. If
placed into a table, even assuming correct the court's other rulings that (1) the inception
of the loss was November 16-17, 2000, (2) the appraisal process did not start until the
Fourth District Court entered an order granting an uncontested motion to compel
appraisal, and (3) the Corporation was not a beneficiary of the parties' 2004 tolling
agreement, the mathematical calculation should still read something like this:
1

Period

Event

Number of Days Counted 1
Toward Limitations Period 1
November 16-17, 2000, to 60-day period during which
0
an action could not be filed.
January 16, 2001
January 17, 2001 -July 11, Period from end of 60-day
prohibition to the date of
2003
Fourth
District
Court's
order granting motion to
compel appraisal
July 12, 2003 - January 9, Appraisal period
2007
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922

0

January 10, 2007 - May 22, Period between appraisal
report and filing
of
,2007
complaint

132 days

Even assuming all other rulings by the court to be correct, therefore, the total days
lapsed before re-filing (922 + 132) was 1054. Three years multiplied by 365 days is 1095
days; the Stone Flood II suit was thus filed more than a month before the limitation
period expired. At the very least, an issue of fact exists in that regard, precluding
summary judgment.
C.

The period of tolling for the appraisal process should have
commenced upon Safeco's election of appraisal pursuant to the
policy.

By statute, u[t]he period of limitation is tolled during the period in which the
parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance policy,
by law, or as agreed to by the parties." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(5). The Safeco
policy provides that, "If we and you disagree on the amount of Net Income and operating
expenses or the amount of loss, either may make written demand for an appraisal of the
loss. In this event, each party will select a competent and impartial appraiser...."
No court order is required to trigger the appraisal procedure; instead, as prescribed
the insurance policy, the appraisal process commences with a "written demand." Safeco
issued its written demand to Stone Flood on February 3, 2003. The trial court should
have commenced the statutory tolling for appraisals on that date.
The trial court assumed, however, that the appraisal process did not commence
until Safeco obtained an unopposed, unnecessary court order months later.
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That

conclusion is contrary to the language of Section 31 A-21-313(5), which states that tolling
is in effect while the parties conduct an "appraisal . . . procedure as prescribed by the
insurance policy " (emphasis added).
Even if the policy had not itself identified a written demand as triggering the
appraisal process, reference to the analogous process of arbitration may be informative.
By statute, arbitrations in Utah are commenced by "notice" to the other party. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-11-110(1) ("A person initiates an arbitration proceeding by giving
notice in a record to the other parties to the agreement to arbitrate in the agreed manner
between the parties...").
As a final observation, the Stones note that Safeco does not claim to have made
payment on the appraisal award - perhaps the most critical part of an appraisal procedure
- on the day it was issued, January 9, 2007, or within three days thereafter. To the
contrary, the record reflects that payment was made on January 17, 2007, eight days after
the award. (R. 682.)
In sum, the trial court should have subtracted at least 158 additional days from its
calculation to reflect the true commencement of the appraisal process, and eight
additional days to reflect the true end of the procedure. On either of these grounds as
well, summary judgment was improper.
D.

Stone Flood's claims expressly fell within the parties' tolling
agreement, or a fact issue exists on that issue.

As noted in the Statement of Facts, the parties entered into an agreement in which
all claims of the parties to both lawsuits were to be expressly tolled pending the appraisal
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process, and also until "discovery [was] completed". The Stone Flood II lawsuit was
filed in May 2007, well before discovery was completed in the case (May 2009).
The trial court concluded that the tolling agreement at least created an issue of fact
with respect to the Stones' claims. In particular, the court found the tolling agreement
ambiguous "as to the extent to which the Stones' individual claims were encompassed in
that agreement and therefore tolled. As such, the court is unable to determine as a matter
of law when the stipulated tolling period ended, disputed issues of material fact remain
concerning the tolling period and [the] court rejects Safeco's contention that the Stones'
claims are untimely as a matter of law." (R. 964.)
The trial court held, however, that as a matter of law, Stone Flood's claims were
not encompassed within the Stones' tolling agreement. (R. 964-965.) With respect, that
conclusion is perplexing.

Correspondence between counsel regarding the tolling

agreement consistently mentioned that it contemplated both of the pending lawsuits. For
example, a June 16, 2004, letter from Safeco's counsel (R. 693-695) summarizing the
parties' discussions stated clearly his understanding that all claims of all parties in both
lawsuits would be covered by the agreement: Not only does the letter's "Re:" line
identify both cases ("Re:

Stone Flood & Fire Restoration Inc. v. Safeco Insurance

Company of America / Stone, et al., v. Safeco Insurance Company of America), but the
letter itself says:
With respect to the Agreement Regarding Appraisal, as set forth in my last letter
to you it seems to me that the only agreement we need is that all of the parties in
the two (2) separate cases will agree to be bound by the single appraisal process.
That way, we can make certain that all parties understand that the single appraisal
process covers all of the contract claims being asserted in both actions.
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Id, <|j4. The letter then lays out the appraisal process that the parties followed.
Again mentioning both lawsuits in the Re: line, another letter from Safeco's
counsel dated May 26, 2004 (R. 680) states: "I have received authority to agree to a
consolidation of the appraisal process for the two (2) pending cases. I would propose that
we file a joint motion to stay the most recently filed case and have our clients agree that
the appraisal process will include the amounts being claimed by all Plaintiffs."
Moreover, counsel for Stone Flood testified that he allowed Stone Flood I to be
dismissed for failure to prosecute in reliance upon the tolling agreement. (R. 288, f 67;
408.) No evidence of any contrary understanding was offered by Safeco or its counsel.
It seems fairly clear from this evidence that Safeco and the plaintiffs in both cases
agreed to put all litigation involving them on hold for the same period of time and for the
same reasons. At the very least, an issue of fact exists in that regard. The trial court
ruled, however, that the correspondence
is simply insufficient as prima facie evidence that Stone Flood's claims were
anticipated by the parties or encompassed by the Tolling Agreement. To the
contrary, it is evident to the court that Stone Flood's claims were not included in
the Tolling Agreement, since the statutory provision applied to Stone Flood as the
named insureds and was in effect at that time. As such, a separate tolling
agreement would have been unnecessary to preserve Stone Flood's claims until
the end of the appraisal process and the dismissal of the Fourth District case.
(R. 964-965.)
There are several problems with this analysis. First, the court failed to account for
the testimony of the Stones' counsel about the parties' communications and his
understanding of the agreement. Second, the court failed to explain why, if Stone Flood
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was not part of the tolling agreement, its name and lawsuit were repeatedly mentioned in
the parties' correspondence. (R. 676-680; 693-695.)
Moreover, the trial court's reasoning is flawed: The court says that including
Stone Flood in the tolling agreement would have been unnecessary because the statute of
limitations on its claims was already tolled by the appraisal process. But that conclusion
fails to recognize that the tolling agreement extended not just to the end of the appraisal
process, but to the subsequent completion of discovery. Consequently, the trial court's
assumption that the contractually agreed tolling period was co-extensive with the
appraisal tolling period is a factual misapprehension.
In any event, the trial court's analysis ignores reality. Under the court's rationale,
the parties' own reference to and inclusion of the two cases is negated entirely because "a
separate tolling agreement would have been unnecessary to preserve Stone Flood's
claims" because of a statutory tolling provision. But attorneys put things in writing all
the time that might already result from operation of law. Why would parties ever sign
releases upon settlement of a lawsuit that is dismissed with prejudice? After all, res
judicata would bar claims that were or could have been brought in the pending lawsuit.
Attorneys are entitled to seek the greatest degree of protection for their clients, or
in the hope of minimizing disputes.

There is no authority that a contract is less

enforceable if it merely restates existing rights than if it grants additional rights.
Additionally, the parties' correspondence reflects an agreement that, upon the
completion of Appraisal, the parties would discuss settlement of the claims before
proceeding with litigation. Per those discussions, the time expended on (ultimately
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unsuccessful) settlement negotiations - again, exceeding three days - should not have
counted toward the limitation period.
For all of the above reasons, a fact issue exists as to the scope of the parties'
tolling agreement, and summary judgment should not have been granted.

II.

JAMES AND PATRICE HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT THEIR
PERSONAL CLAIMS.

In the court below, Safeco argued that the Stones lacked standing to bring any
personal claims because they were not insureds under the policy. (R. 151-154; 156-160.)
The trial court ultimately agreed. (R. 951-957.)
A.

An issue of fact exists as to whether Safeco effectively deemed
the Stones to be, or imposed obligations on the Stones as,
insureds.

There is evidence in the record that Safeco itself treated the Stones as insureds.
For example, as noted previously, before paying any benefits under the policy, Safeco
required James and Patrice personally to sign a non-waiver agreement that identified
James Stone as "the insured," and Patrice as his "spouse." {See R. 664.) Unless Safeco
admits that it was refusing to pay benefits to an insured unless a non-insured guaranteed
repayment - which would be bad faith as a matter of law - then Safeco must concede that
the Stones were de facto insureds.11

11

Both Jim and Patrice were required to sign, which would not have been necessary if the
signature was merely on behalf of the corporation, in which case a single authorized
signature would suffice. Moreover, Safeco is a sophisticated client, and was presumably
well aware of the settled principle that signatures that are not accompanied by a clear
statement of corporate capacity are deemed to be in the signer's personal capacity. DBL
Distributing, Inc. v. 1 Cache, LLC, 2006 UT App 400, \ 13, 147 P.3d 478, and numerous
cases cited.
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The trial court disregarded this evidence, concluding that the policy "clearly
identifies Stone Flood & Fire Restoration, I n c . . . . as the named insureds," and "[t]here is
no reference to coverage being extended to unnamed insureds." (R. 957.)
With respect, the trial court failed to address the Stones' actual argument. The
Stones did not argue that the policy by its language encompassed "unnamed insureds";
they argued that, by virtue of its actions, Safeco imposed obligations upon the Stones that
effectively deemed, or recognized, the Stones as insureds under the policy. Thus, for
example, Safeco never identified any provision of the policy that could allow it to force
the Stones individually to guarantee reimbursement of payments made to the corporation,
unless the Stones themselves were insureds under the policy.
Safeco's actions created an issue of fact as to whether the Stones qualified as
insureds under the policy.
B.

Safeco's argument fails in any event with respect to the Stones'
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and bad
faith.

The trial court found that sufficient evidence existed of outrageous conduct by
Safeco to support a claim by the Stones for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
However, the Court concluded that such a claim is barred by the Utah Court of Appeals'
ruling in Stocks v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 2000 UT App 139, 3 P.3d
722. ("Although a material issue of act precludes summary judgment on the Stones'
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Stones do not have standing
under Stocks:') (See R. 952.)
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Although the trial court felt bound by the Court of Appeals' ruling, the court
appeared to have some misgivings about the application of Stocks to closely held
corporations. The court first wrote:
At the initial hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the court
expressed the view that the Stones might have standing to assert claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court based that view on the close
economic connection between the Stones and the corporation. As the only
shareholders of the corporation, the Stones looked to the corporation as their sole
means of support. As such, it was clearly foreseeable that any outrageous conduct
directed toward the corporation would affect the Stones in a direct and personal
way. This is clearly distinguishable from the situation when the shareholders of a
corporation are merely passive investors. In the court's view, the tort doctrine of
foreseeability would provide an adequate limitation on standing that would not
open up the prospect of shareholders routinely suing for conduct that was directed
at a corporation.
(R. 953.)
The court then stated that it was obligated by Stocks to dismiss the Stones' claims:
The court did not, however, distinguish the case of Stocks v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 2000 UT App 139, 3 P.3d 722 (2000). On further reflection, the
court should not have ignored a case that is directly on point.
To have standing, a plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered some
distinct and palpable injury. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983).
In Stocks, the Court addressed whether the individual plaintiffs had standing to
recover personally for costs and emotional distress damages from an insurance
company's breach of contract and failure to provide proper insurance coverage.
Generally, although a shareholder may own all of the stock in a
corporation, such ownership does not authorize him to sue as an individual for
wrong done to the corporation by a third party. Stocks, 2000 UT App 139 at ^[11
quoting Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Utah
1979). However, "a shareholder may bring an individual cause of action if the
harm to the corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather than
a shareholder . . . in cases which the wrong itself is a violation of a duty arising
from a contract or otherwise, and owed directly to the shareholder." Stocks, 2000
UT App 139 at 1fll quoting DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 598
(Utah Ct. App. 1995).
The Court [of Appeals] declined to confer standing on the Stocks, finding
that the Stocks' injuries, including that for intentional infliction of emotional
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distress, resulted from damage to their corporation, not as a direct result of any
breach or damage to the Stocks personally.
Here, like Stocks, the injuries claimed by the Stones have arisen
derivatively from the damage suffered by the corporation, namely Stone Flood.
As plaintiffs admit, the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress was
caused by Safeco's alleged failure to make timely payments under the insurance
policies for Stone Flood's losses and the resulting collapse of Stone Flood, not out
of a duty owed to the Stones as individuals.
(R. 953-954 [ellipse in original; bracketed text added].)
In concluding its analysis, the court recognized the implications of its ruling on the
Stones and others in their position:
The court is not unaware that by making this ruling, sole shareholders in a closely
held family business are effectively barred from bringing a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress against an insurer, either on behalf of themselves as
individuals or on behalf of their corporation. However, this court is bound by the
decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and must make its rulings in conformance
therewith.
(R. 956.)
The Stones respectfully submit that the trial court erred in interpreting Stocks, and
also that Stocks does not address the facts presented here, nor accurately reflect Utah law
on the subject.
The Stocks court recognized that individuals who happen to be shareholders may
pursue personal claims if the defendant is alleged to have breached an independent duty
to them. Safeco's duty not to intentionally or recklessly inflict severe emotional distress
upon the Stones was wholly separate and distinct from contractual duties owed to Stone
Flood. A claim for IIED does not require privity or other contractual relationship; rather,
any victim of conduct committed "where any reasonable person would have known that
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[severe emotional distress] would result" may pursue a claim. Bennett v. Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ^| 58 (articulating elements of IIED claim).
Moreover, Stocks either does not apply, or does not correctly predict Utah law,
under the circumstances presented here. Stocks applies only to quasi-derivative claims, in
which a shareholder is essentially pursuing claims that belong solely to the corporation.
This Court has not addressed the issue, but some courts have held that individuals may
sue if they have suffered injury as the result of a personal guaranty, as in the case here.
See, e.g., Sacks v. American Fletcher National Bank and Trust Co., 258 Ind. 189, 279
N.E.2d 807, 812 (1972) ("[I]t is clear a personal guaranty for a loan to a corporation can
be the basis for a personal cause of action."); Davis v. United States Gypsum Co., 451
F.2d 659, 662 (3rd Cir. 1971) (applying Pennsylvania law); see also Weiss v. Northwest
Acceptance Corp., 274 Or. 343, 546 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Ore. 1976) (recognizing that
individual shareholder may sue if he was induced by defendant's wrongful acts to assume
corporate liability).
Moreover, permitting the Stones to pursue claims in this case would not implicate
the policy concerns that bar most individual-shareholder lawsuits. Stone Flood was a
closely held corporation; the impact of breaches on these individuals was not only
foreseeable but known to Safeco, and there is no multitude of passive shareholder claims
lurking.
Shareholders of a closely held corporation are foreseeable beneficiaries of a
property insurance policy. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795,
802 (Utah 1985) ("it is axiomatic that insurance frequently is purchased not only to
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provide funds in case of loss, but to provide peace of mind for the insured or his
beneficiaries") (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1);
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah
1989).
Additionally, unlike the circumstances considered by Utah appellate courts to date,
Safeco was informed in advance, and with specificity, of what James and Patrice were
being forced to do because of its breach of duties. Safeco's adjuster knew that payroll
was every two weeks, and that, by refusing to pay anything toward business interruption
for months, Safeco was forcing the Stones to infuse their own money to meet the
corporation's legal obligations to its employees. See Statement of Facts, p. 10. Safeco's
actions, if believed by a jury, violated duties to Stones as known beneficiaries under the
policy.
Under the circumstances of this case, Utah law should not preclude James and
Patrice from pursuing claims apart from Stone Flood.
C.

James and Patrice also have standing because of statutorily
imposed personal liability.

Finally, James and Patrice have standing as named plaintiffs because, as a result of
Safeco's breaches, personal liability to the corporation's creditors has been imposed upon
them by statute. The trial court did not address this contention. However, as mentioned
above, Safeco's failure to pay benefits within a reasonable period of time forced Stone
Flood into dissolution. Under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408(2), personal liability for
corporate debts was imposed upon the Stones, to the extent that the Stones received any
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corporate assets. In other words, Safeco's breaches directly deprived the Stones of
distributions which they otherwise would have been entitled to retain - a distinct and
palpable injury.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellants respectfully request the Court reverse
the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case for trial.
DATED this 18th day of October, 2010.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

o

MAK
( ij, ^ , ^
L. Rich Humphreys
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellants
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This is to certify that on the 18th day of October, 2010, two true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Matthew L. Lalli
Troy L. Booher
SNELL & WILMER
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellee
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

L. Rich Humpheiy^
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellants
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ADDENDUM

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment on All Claims - 11/03/2009
Tentative Ruling for Hearing February 5, 2010 - 01/26/2010
Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and Dismissing All Remaining Claims 02/05/2010
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Attorneys for Defendant Safeco Insurance Company ofAmerica
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STONE FLOOD AND FIRE
RESTORATION, INC., JAMES K.
STONE AND PATRICE STONE,
Plaintiffs,

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL CLAIMS

v.

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,

Civil No. 070907640
Honorable Anthony Quinn

Defendant.

On October 9, 2009, and October 14, 2009, the court heard arguments on Safeco
Insurance Company of America's motion for summary judgment. At the hearings, Safeco was
represented by Matthew Lalli and Troy Booher, and Stone Flood and Fire Restoration Inc.,
James Stone, and Patrice Stone were represented by Rich Humpherys and Karra Porter. After
having reviewed the written submissions and having heard oral argument, and for good cause,
the court grants in part and denies in part the motion for summary judgment, and rules as
follows.
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In ruling on the motion, it is useful to divide those claims brought by the Stones as
individuals and those brought by Stone Flood as a corporation and an insured under the Safeco
insurance policy. On May 22, 2007, Stone Flood filed claims for (i) breach of contract;
(ii) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (iii) misrepresentation and fraud;
(iv) negligent misrepresentation; and (v) deceptive advertising. On September 17, 2007, the
Stones filed claims for (i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; (iii) misrepresentation and fraud; (iv) negligent misrepresentation; (v) deceptive
advertising; and (vi) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Both Stone Flood and the
Stones sought punitive damages. Safeco moved for summary judgment on all claims on the
ground that they are untimely and that they fail as a matter of law on their merits.
In their opposition papers, both Stone Flood and the Stones concede that summary
judgment is appropriate on their claims for deceptive advertising. The court therefore grants the
motion for summary judgment on the deceptive advertising claims.
The court also grants the motion for summary judgment on Stone Flood's remaining
claims on the ground that they are untimely under the applicable statutes of limitation, which are
(i) the 3-year statute of limitation governing the two contract claims in Utah Code Ann. § 31A21-313(1) (2000); and (ii) the 3-year statute of limitation governing the two fraud and
misrepresentation claims in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) (2000). Stone Flood incurred an
insurable loss when a fire destroyed the building in which Stone Flood did business on
November 16-17, 2000. Stone Flood did not file the current lawsuit until May 22, 2007, well
outside the 3-year period.
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Under section 31A-21-313, the statute of limitation for Stone Flood's two contract claims
was tolled during the period in which Stone Flood and Safeco conducted an appraisal concerning
the insured loss. The appraisal was ordered on July 11, 2003, and concluded on January 9, 2007.
Excluding the time period of July 11, 2003, to January 9, 2007, Stone Flood still filed its claim
outside the 3-year time period. And the savings statute does not apply because Stone Flood's
first lawsuit was dismissed on September 16,2005, more than a year before Stone Flood's filing
this lawsuit on May 22, 2007. Therefore, all of Stone Flood's claims are barred by the applicable
statutes of limitation. The court grants the motion for summary judgment on Stone Flood's
remaining claims.
As for the question of whether the Stones' claims are time barred, a disputed issue of
material fact precludes summary judgment. The statutes of limitation applicable to the Stones'
claims are (i) the 3-year statute of limitation governing the two contract claims in Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) (2000); (ii) the 3-year statute of limitation governing the two fraud and
misrepresentation claims in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-21-313(l) (2000); and (iii) the 4-year statute
of limitation governing claims involving intentional infliction of emotional distress in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (2000). On June 14, 2004, Safeco signed a stipulation in which it agreed the
Stones' then-pending claims would be tolled "until discovery is completed." The court is unable
to determine as a matter of law what discovery Safeco and the Stones were referring to in the
stipulation, and therefore, the court is unable to conclude as a matter of law when the stipulated
tolling period ended. Because disputed issues of material fact remain concerning the tolling
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period, the court rejects Safeco's contention that the Stones' claims are untimely as a matter of
law. The court therefore must address the merits of the Stones' remaining claims.
As to the Stones' two contract claims, the Stones lack standing to bring these claims
because they are not insureds under the insurance policy with Safeco. The court rejects the
Stones' argument that they became insureds after the fire when they signed a "non-waiver
agreement" in which they agreed that Safeco was not waiving its right to deny coverage by its
investigation of the claim. This "non-waiver agreement" is insufficient to create a disputed issue
of material fact concerning whether the Stones were insureds under the policy. The policy itself
does not list them as insureds. Because the Stones, as individuals, are not insureds, their contract
claims fail as a matter of law. The court grants the motion for summary judgment on the Stones'
two contract claims.
The Stones' fraud and misrepresentation claims also fail as a matter of law. All of the
alleged misrepresentations concern Safeco's promises to perform in certain ways at some future
time. Safeco contends that it intended to perform as it represented when it made the alleged
representations. The Stones have not alleged, and have not provided any evidence, that at the
time Safeco made any of the alleged misrepresentations concerning Safeco's future performance,
Safeco did not intend to perform as it represented. Because the Stones' fraud and
misrepresentation claims require proof that Safeco did not intend to perform as it represented at
the time Safeco made the representations, those claims fail as a matter of law. The court grants
the motion for summary judgment on the Stones' two fraud and misrepresentation claims.
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A disputed issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the Stones' claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court finds that, from the totality of evidence
presented, a question of fact exists as to whether Safeco engaged in outrageous conduct toward
the Stones, and whether it was foreseeable that its alleged conduct would cause the Stones severe
emotional distress. For these reasons, summary judgment is not appropriate on the Stones' claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
Safeco's motion for summary judgment is granted as to all claims except the Stones'
individual claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. All other claims are hereby
dismissed with prejudice.

Karra Porter
Christensen & Jensen, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

10644735

5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ffi day of October, 2009,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to be sent via first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
L. Rich Humpherys
Karra J. Porter
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STONE FLOOD AND FIRE RESTORATION:
INC., JAMES K. STONE AND
PATRICE STONE,

TENTATIVE RULING FOR
HEARING FEB. 5, 2 010
CASE NO.

Plaintiffs,

070907640

:
DATE: JANUARY £0?,

vs.
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,

2 010

JUDGE: ANTHONY B. QUINN

Defendant.

The above matter came before the court on plaintiffs' rule
54(b) motion

to

revise

order.

The

court,

having

carefully

considered the motion and relevant law, hereby rules as follows:

I.

Background
On October 9, 2009 and October 14, 2009, the court heard

arguments on defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Defendant

argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because plaintiffs'
claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the
Stones lacked standing to sue Safeco and the undisputed evidence
entitled Safeco to judgment as a matter of law on all claims.

After consideration of the parties' arguments and briefs, the
court entered a proposed order on November 3, 2009 ("the Order").
The court granted summary judgment on all claims for deceptive
advertising, acknowledging the plaintiffs' concession that summary
judgment was appropriate, found sill of Stone Flood's remaining
claims were untimely under the 3-year statute of limitation set
forth in Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-313(1), denied summary judgment on
the Stones' individual claims on the basis of untimeliness, granted
summary judgment on the Stones' individual contract claims because
the Stones lack standing, found that the Stones did not allege and
did not provide any evidence that at the time Safeco made any of
the alleged misrepresentations concerning its future performance,
it did not intend to perform as it represented, and ruled that a
material issue of disputed fact precluded summary judgment on the
Stones' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff timely objected to the Order, arguing that all
claims were timely because the court erred in calculating the
statute of limitations, the 2004 Tolling Agreement covered all
parties to the current litigation thus extending the statute of
limitations,

and

the

statute

of

limitations

continuing negotiations between the parties.

-2-

was

tolled

by

II.

Rule 54(b) Motion to Revise Order

A.

Standard of Review
Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "an

order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties."
see also Ferguson

v.

Williams

& Hunt,

Inc.,

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b);
2009 UT 49, 635 Utah

Adv. Rep. 73.
The factors to be considered in determining the propriety of
reconsidering

a prior ruling, include, but are not limited to,

"when (1) the matter is presented in a 'different light' or under
'different
governing

circumstances;'
law;

(2) there has been a change

(3) a party

offers new evidence;

(4)

in

the

'manifest

injustice' will result if the court does not reconsider the prior
ruling;

(5) a court needs to correct its own errors; or

issue was
court."

inadequately

Trembly

v. Mrs.

briefed
Fields

when
Cookies,

first

contemplated

(6) an
by

the

884 P. 2d 1306, 1311 (Utah

Ct. App. 1994) .
The court finds that there is cause to reexamine its Order and
hereby makes the following rulings.

III. Discussion
A.

The Stones' Tort Claims

2.

The Stones'
misrepresentation

individual
fail

tort
claims
for
fraud
as a matter
of law because
-3-

and
there

is no evidence
that
it made the alleged
As

discussed

in

Safeco

the

misrepresentation

claims

misrepresentation

of

did not intend
representations.

Order,

fail

intended

as

the
a

future

to perform

Stones'

matter

of

performance

when

fraud
u

law.
is

and

not

[A]
a

representation concerning a 'presently existing fact' upon which a
claim for fraud can be based unless . . . [the plaintiff] . . .can prove
that. .. [the defendant] . .., at the time of the representation, did
not intend to perform the promise and made the representation for
the purpose of deceiving [the plaintiff] . Republic
Won-Door Corp.,

Group,

Inc.

v.

883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Here, the Stones have not alleged and have provided the court
with no evidence that, at the time the alleged misrepresentations
concerning Safeco"s future performance were made, Safeco did not
intend to perform as it represented to the Stones. When considered
with Safeco's assertion that it and its agents intended to perform
as represented to the Stones1, the Stones have failed to support a
claim for fraud or misrepresentation, and their claims fail as a
matter of law.

2.

Although
a material
issue
of fact
precludes
judgment on the Stones'
claim for intentional
of emotional
distress,
the Stones
do not have
under
Stocks.

summary
infliction
standing

As discussed in Order, the court reviewed the totality of the

*See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 12-14
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evidence before it on the motion for summary judgment and found
that a material question of fact existed as to whether Safeco
engaged in outrageous conduct towards the Stones and whether it was
foreseeable

that

such

emotional distress.

conduct

would

cause

the

Stones

severe

Having again read the parties' briefs and

considered the facts before it, the court concludes its decisoin
was reasonable, but not supported by existing case law.
At the initial hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the
court expressed the view that the Stones might have standing to
assert claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
court based that view on the close economic connection between the
Stones and the corporation.

As the only shareholders of the

corporation, the Stones looked to the corporation as their sole
means of support.

As such, it was clearly foreseeable that any

outrageous conduct directed toward the corporation would affect the
Stones

in

a

direct

distinguishable

and

personal

way.

doctrine

is

clearly

from the situation when the shareholders of a

corporation are mere passive investors.
tort

This

of

foreseeability

In the court's view, the

would

provide

an

adequate

limitation on standing that would not open up the prospect of
shareholders routinely suing for conduct that was directed at a
corporation.
Stocks
722

v.

The court did not, however, distinguish the case of

United

(2000) .

States

Fid.

& Guar.

Co.,

2000 UT App. 139, 3 P. 3d

On further reflection, the court should not have

-5-

ignored a case that is directly on point.
To have standing, a plaintiff must be able to show that he has
Jenkins

suffered some distinct and palpable injury.
P.2d

1145,

whether

1148

the

personally
insurance

(Utah

1983).

individual

for

costs

company's

Stocks,

In

plaintiffs

and

breach

emotional
of

the

had

Court

standing

distress

contract

v. Swan,

and

addressed

to

damages

failure

675

to

recover
from

an

provide

proper insurance coverage.
Generally, although a shareholder may own all of the stock in
a corporation, such ownership does not authorize him to sue as an
individual for wrong done to the corporation by a third party.
Stocks,
Thrift

2000 UT App 139 at 1|ll quoting Norman
& Loan

Co.,

v. Murray

First

596 P. 2d 1028, 1031-32 (Utah 1979) . However, "a

shareholder may bring an individual cause of action if the harm to
the

corporation

also

damaged

the

shareholder

as

an

individual

rather than a shareholder... in cases which the wrong itself is a
violation of a duty arising from a contract or otherwise, and owed
directly to the shareholder."
quoting VLB Collection
App.

Trust

v.

Stocks,
Harris,

2000 UT App

139 at

fll

893 P. 2d 593, 598 (Utah Ct.

1995).
The Court declined to confer standing to the Stocks, finding

that

the

Stocks'

injuries,

including

that

for

intentional

infliction of emotional distress, resulted from damage to their
corporation, not as a direct result of any breach or damage to the
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Stocks personally.
Here, like Stocks,

the injuries claimed by the Stones have

arisen derivatively from the damage suffered by the corporation,
namely Stone Flood.

As plaintiffs admit, the alleged intentional

infliction of emotional distress was caused by Safeco's alleged
failure to make timely payments under the insurance policies for
Stone Flood's losses and the resulting collapse of Stone Flood, not
out of a duty owed to the Stones as individuals.
Stones

are not named

independent

claim

insureds and therefore

for

insurance

coverage

Additionally, the
could not make

with

Safeco.

an

Such

indirect injury is insufficient to confer standing.
Finally, plaintiff's reliance on Campbell
misplaced.
rejected

the

Plaintiffs
idea

that

state
only

that

under

a named

vr

State

Campbell,

insured

Farm
the

can bring

is

Court
claims

arising out of a breach of duty by an insurance policy.
First, this issue was not definitively addressed by the Court.
To the contrary, the Court appears to have adopted the Campbells'
statement that they were both insured under the policy issued by
State Farm.

Campbell,

840 P. 2d 130, 132

(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Second, while the Court noted that it "decline[d] to address State
Farm's argument that Mrs. Campbell lacks standing...finding it to
be without merit," that is the extent of the discussion.
143.

Id.

at

Whether State Farm argued that Mrs. Campbell lacked standing

because she was not named under the policy, or whether State Farm
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argued

another

unclear.

reason

Absent

why

more,

Mrs.

this

characterization of Campbell,

Campbell

court

lacked

cannot

standing,

accept

is

plaintiffs'

nor can it find definitively that the

Court found that an unnamed insured can bring claims arising out of
a breach of duty by an insurance policy.
The court is not unaware that by making this ruling,
shareholders

in a closely held

barred

bringing

from

emotional
themselves

distress
as

a

claim

against

individuals

family business are
for

an
or

intentional

insurer,

on

behalf

effectively

infliction

of

on

of

either
of

sole

their

behalf

corporation.

However, this court is bound by the decisions of the Utah Court of
Appeals and must make its rulings in conformance therewith.
Therefore, finding no reasonable basis to distinguish the case
at bar from Stocks,

and finding Campbell

inapplicable, the court

revises its earlier ruling and finds that the Stones lack standing
for

their

intentional

infliction

of

emotional

distress

claim

because it is derivative of the claims suffered by Stone Flood and
therefore not a duty "owed directly" to the Stones.

B.

The Stone's Contract Claims
In their opposition to summary judgment, the Stones argue that

although they are not individually identified as named insureds on
the Safeco policies, the Stones are
insureds."

xx

beneficiaries and/or unnamed

In support of this contention, plaintiffs offer the
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court "a non-waiver agreement that identified James Stone as the
insured and Patrice Stone as his spouse."

Plaintiffs also offers

a single reference to an internal Safeco record which refers to Jim
and Patrice Stone as "insureds."2
Plaintiffs are clearly not named insureds.
Policy

Change

issued

by

Safeco

on

October

The Commercial

31,

2000

clearly

identifies Stone Flood & Fire Restoration, Inc; Dust Free Floors
Finishing Inc.; and Aqua Clean Corp. as the named insureds.

The

policies each state that "[t]hroughout this policy the words "you"
and "your" refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations."
There is no reference to coverage being extended to unnamed
insureds.

Absent any such proof, plaintiffs' assertions fail to

create a material dispute of fact.3
Because the Stones are not named insureds, and because they
have presented this court with no evidence that they are unnamed
insureds,

they

have

no

standing

with

respect

to

any

contract

claims.

Plaintiffs do not argue that status as beneficiaries
confers standing and so the court declines to address that issue.
because neither party has provided a complete policy, it is
impossible to for the court to decide as a matter of law whether
unnamed insureds are covered without a complete policy. However,
plaintiffs have the duty to provide the court with such
information and in the absence of that information, the court
must assume that only the named insureds are covered.
-9-

C.

Corporate Contract Claims

The Court's math and findings
of the statute
of limitations

I.

a.

regarding
are not

the
commencement
in
error.

Tucker did not decide whether a statute of
limitations could run under U.C.A. §31A-21-313(1)
during the period when suit could not be brought
under U.C.A. §31A-21-313(4).

Plaintiffs argue that the court's reading of Tucker

v.

State

Farm was incorrect, and that the Court's cite to U.C.A. §31A-21313(4)

in

Tucker's

limitations

discussion

indicated

an

of

the

implicit

applicaible

recognition

statute

that

of

§31A-21-

313(4) (a) provides a sixty (60) day extension to the 3-year statute
of limitations for first-party insurance claims, since an action
may not be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to
compel payment under the policy for 60 days after proof of loss is
furnished as required under the policy.
UT 54, 53 P.3d 947., see

also

U.C.A

Tucker

v.

State

Farm,

§31A-21-313 (4) (a) (1953).

2002
The

court does not agree.
In Tucker,

it was clear that the statute of limitations had

run on the plaintiff's case, absent some theory of tolling.
this

reason,

it

was

not

important

to

the

Court

to

For

determine

precisely when the statute of limitations began to run.

For the

Court's purpose, it was sufficient

court's

to accept

the trial

statement that "in a case involving the alleged failure to pay PIP
benefits, the [inception of the loss occurs] no latter than the date
on which the insurer refuses to pay the disputed PIP benefits."
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Tucker,

2002 UT 54 at Kl5.

There was no reason for the Court to

define the phrase "inception of the loss" precisely, nor was there
reason

for

the

Court

to

consider

the

interplay

between

§

31A-21-313(1) and § 31A-21-313(4).

b.

Inception of the loss relates to the time of the
loss the insured was insured against began and not
as of the date of the denial of the claim.

Further, plaintiffs argue that the court erred in determining
that the "inception of the loss" was the date of the fire, but
rather began to run on the date Safeco failed to pay.
v. Beneficial

Fire

& Casualty

In

Anderson

Co.,21 Utah 2d 173 (Utah 1968), the

Court held that the term "inception of the loss" contained in an
insurance

policy

"commences

to

run

at

the

time

of

loss

or

death. . . [and] . . .the date of an accident resulting in death, and not
the date of death, has been held to control." Anderson, 21 Utah 2d
at 934.
Lake

City,

In Canadian

Indemnity

Co. v. Budget

Rent-A-Car

of

Salt

IAS F.Supp. 661 (D.Utah 1990), the U.S. District Court

interpreted and clarified Anderson

in light of §31A-21-313, finding

that the term "inception of the loss" was specifically intended by
the Utah Legislature to refer to "the time the first loss was
incurred."
In the absence of any case law in this specific context to the
contrary, the court agrees with this interpretation of §31A-21-313.
Thus, as stated in its previous proposed order, for the purposes of
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determining

when

the

statute

of

limitations

b€>gan to run,

the

inception of the loss occurred on November 16-17, 2000, the date of
the catastrophic fire in Stone Flood's building.

c.

In order to give effect to the entire statute the
court must decide that the statute of limitations
began at the time of the fire.

Further, in order to give effect to all of U.C.A. §31A-21-313,
the court cannot accept plaintiffs' construction of the statute.
At issue before the court is the apparent conflict between
section 31A-21-313(1) and section 31A-21-313(4) .
313 (1) ,

xv

Under §31A-21-

[a] n action on a written policy or contract of first party

insurance must be commenced within three years after the inception
of the loss."

By contrast, under 31A-21-313 (4) an action may not

be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to compel
payment under the policy until the earlier of 60 days after proof
of loss is furnished as required under the policy or the insurer's
denial of full payment.

Plaintiffs' argument is that 31A-21-313(4)

should control.
The application of a statute of limitations is a question of
law.

In

re

Hoopiiaina

Trust,

2006 UT 53, P 19, 144 P. 3d 1129.

Statutory interpretation is also a question of law. Sill
2007 UT 45, P 5, 162 P.3d 1099.

v.

Hart,

When interpreting a statute, the

court is required to look at the plain language of the statute.
Evans

v.

State,

963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998).
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Here, the plain language of §31A-21-313(1) requires that a
first-party

insurance action must be brought within three years

after the inception of the loss.
unambiguous.

That language is absolute and

Section 31A-21-313(4) however, is not absolute, since

it expressly provides that it may be waived where the complainant
will suffer prejudice.

Further, if the court were to read §31A-21-

313(4) as establishing the correct time for filing an action, it
would render §31A-21-313(1) meaningless, since the two triggering
events

(filing the proof

of claim or relying on the

insurer's

denial of payment) could conceivably occur well outside of the
three

year

Conversely,
limitation

time
if
of

the

period
court

action

after
were

the
to

time-frame,

inception

read

of

the

§31A-21-313 (1)

§31A-21-313(4)

would

loss.
as

the

not

be

rendered meaningless, since if either of the two triggering events
were to result in a claim being filed outside of the three year
time period, the complainant could easily file a verified complaint
alleging prejudice, thereby waiving such limitations.

Moreover, a

ruling that the statute would not begin to run until sixty days
after the submission of a proof of loss would allow an insured to
delay the running of the statute indefinitely.
Therefore, the most logical and reasonable construction of the
statute, and the one which gives full effect to both §31A-21-313(1)
and §31A-21-313(4) , requires that an action on a written policy of
first party insurance be filed within three years after the event
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triggering the loss, and that such a time period cannot be extended
by any of the conditions under §31A-21-313(4).
For the same reason, the court cannot find that the limitation
on the commencement of suit under §31A-21-313(4) tolls the statute
of

limitations.

Therefore,

since

the

inception

of

the

loss

occurred on November 16-17, 2000, the plaintiffs would have had to
file their claim prior to November 17, 2003 in order to be timely
under §31A-21-313. 4
Finally, the court acknowledges Plaintiffs' argument that in
some instances, the law tolls a state of limitations during the
time

which

Plaintiffs

a

party

argue

is

that

prohibited
pursuant

to

by

law

this

from

policy,

bringing
under

suit.

§31A-21-

313(4), the court should subtract sixty days from its calculations.
While it is true that many courts, including Utah, agree with such
a policy as a general principle, the application of that principle
cannot

be used,

as plaintiffs

suggest

here,

to contravene

the

express language of a statute, nor have plaintiffs cited any case
law which persuades the court that such an application of

this

principle is warranted in the instant case.

4

This does not take into account the time during
parties conducted an appraisal, arbitration or the tolling
agreement plaintiffs contend tolled the statute of limitations
beyond November 17, 2003.
-14-

d.

Section 78B-2-112 does not apply.

Plaintiffs also argue that the court erred in not considering
U.C.A.

§786-2-112,

which

states

that

"[t]he

duration

of

an

injunction or statutory prohibition which delays the filing of an
action may not be counted as part of the statute of limitations."
If read in conjunction with §31A-21-313(a) , §78B-2-112 would extend
the filing time in this case an additional 60 days, thereby making
plaintiffs' claims timely.
Plaintiffs'

reliance

Under §31A-21-313 (1) ,

xx

on

§78B-2-112

however,

is

misplaced.

[a] n action on a written policy or contract

of first party insurance must be commenced within three years after
the inception of the loss."

§31A-21-313(2) reads that "[e]xcept as

provided in Subsection (1) [namely 31A-21-313(1)] or elsewhere in
this title [namely Title 31A-Insurance Code], the law applicable to
limitation

of

actions

in

Title

78B,

Chapter

2,

Statutes

Limitations, applies to actions on insurance policies."

of

Thus,

under the plain meaning of §31A-21-313 (2), any law applicable to
the limitations of actions in Title 78B only applies if §31A-21313(1) does

not.

arguably extend

Therefore, §78B-2-112, which if in effect, would
the statute of limitations

for an action on a

written policy of insurance for an additional 60 days after proof
of

loss

was

furnished

to

the

insurance

company,

may

only

be

considered in situations where §31A-21-313 (1) does not apply, such
as in a "third-party" insurance agreement
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(where the insured have

claims against the insurer for a bad faith failure to settle a
third party claim).
Here, however, plaintiffs do not contend that a "third-party"
relationship exists between the parties, but rather that a "firstparty" relationship exists.

As such, §31A-21-313(1) applies, and

by the express language of the statute, §31A-21-313(2) does not.

e.

With

Court's ruling that the Tolling
ambiguous was not in error.

respect

to

the

2004

Tolling

Agreement

Agreement,

the

was

court

reaffirms its earlier findings that the agreement is ambiguous as
to

the

extent

to

which

the

Stones'

individual

claims

were

encompassed in that agreement and therefore tolled. As such, the
court is unable to determine as a matter of law when the stipulated
tolling

period

ended,

disputed

issues

of material

fact

remain

concerning the tolling period and court rejects Safeco's contention
that the Stones' claims are untimely as a matter of law.

f.

Although

Plaintiffs'
agreement.
plaintiffs

letters

urge

the

do not

court

constitute

to accept

a

tolling

two

letters

(dated June 16, 2004 and May 26, 2006 respectively) as evidence
that Stone Flood and the Stones were both parties
Tolling Agreement, the court does not agree.

to the

2004

The language in those

letters is simply insufficient as prima facie evidence that Stone
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Flood's claims were anticipated by the parties or encompassed by
the Tolling Agreement.
that

Stone

Flood's

To the contrary, it is evident to the court

claims

were

not

included

in

the

Tolling

Agreement, since the statutory provision applied to Stone Flood as
the named insureds and was in effect at that time.

As such, a

separate tolling agreement would have been unnecessary to preserve
Stone Flood's claims until the end of the appraisal process and the
dismissal of the Fourth District case.

g.

Rice

is inapplicable.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that under jRice v.
District,
should

23 Utah 2d 22
be

tolled

during

Granite

School

(Utah 1969), the statute of limitations
the period

in which

the parties

were

engaged in ongoing negotiations.
The Utah courts recognize that although statutorily mandated,
statutes of limitations may be extended

in specific

instances,

including u [w]here...the delay in commencing action was induced by
the conduct of the party sought to be charged" such that it would
be

inequitable

to

allow

limitations as a defense.

the
Rice,

latter

to

invoke

the

23 Utah 2d at 26-27.

statute

of

"To create

an equitable estoppel, it is enough if the party has been induced
to refrain

from using such means or taking such action as lay in

his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved
himself from loss."

Id.

at 27 (internal citations omitted).
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"The question of whether negotiations for the compromise of a
claim or debt will give rise to an estoppel against pleading the
statute

of

limitations

of

the

negotiations and the circumstances surrounding the parties."

Id.

In Rice,

depends

upon

the

character

the Court considered whether a defendant was estopped

to assert the statute of limitations, ultimately finding that the
trial court erred in entering summary judgment against plaintiff
since a material issue of fact existed as to whether defendant was
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations in its defense.
Rice,
bar.

however, is clearly distinguishable from the case at

First, in Rice,

the plaintiff made specific allegations that

the defendant's agent admitted liability and promised compensation
upon several occasions.

Plaintiff was led to believe that the only

unresolved issue was the amount of her damages once her medical
care terminated.
a

trier

of

This, the Court reasoned, was sufficient to allow

fact

to

conclude

that

defendant's

agent

induced

plaintiff to delay filing her action.
Here, by contrast, plaintiffs have provided the court with no
facts in the record by which to reasonably conclude that defendant
induced

plaintiffs

Rather, plaintiffs

into

delaying

reference

the

filing

their statement

of
of

this

facts

action.
in their

opposition to summary judgment for the general proposition that
negotiations

between

the

parties

"occurred

at

various

times,"

arguing that these negotiations at the very least create a material
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QUn

issue of fact as to if defendant is estopped from relying on the
statute of limitations to bar their claims.
The evidence cited in support of this contention is twofold:
(1)

a

January

23,

2007

letter

from

defendant's

counsel

to

plaintiffs' counsel enclosing an additional payment of $39,571.01
to plaintiffs; and (2) a January 8, 2004 letter discussing the
status of certain issues between the parties.
First, the court does not believe that two letters written
three

years

apart

are

by

themselves

sufficient

evidence

of

"continuing negotiations," such that plaintiffs were induced to
delay filing the lawsuit.
that

the

January

8,

Second, even if the court was to find

2004

letter

is

evidence

of

continuing

negotiations, the January 23, 2007 letter specifically notes that
"the payment of ...funds [to plaintiff] should
be a waiver
clients

of any defenses

should

Moreover,

this

that

matter
letter

that

Safeco

continue."

has

not be considered
to the

claims

of

to
your

Pi. Ex. H (emphasis added).

explicitly

disputes

plaintiffs'

characterization of the incident, which, at the very least, should
have put plaintiffs on notice that Safeco did not concede the
fundamental validity of plaintiffs' claims.
distinguishable from Rice,

This is clearly

where defendant arguably led plaintiffs

to believe that there was no dispute as to the underlying validity
of her claim.
Plaintiffs have failed to provide the court with facts in the
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record such that reasonable minds could conclude that defendant
induced plaintiffs to delay filing their claim under the auspices
of these continuing negotiations and therefore the court rejects
plaintiffs' contention that the statute of limitations was tolled
during the pendency of this matter.

Therefore plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is GRANTED
and the court's proposed order dated November 3, 2009 is revised in
accordance with the above.

Dated this £ (* day of January,

£
ANTHONYJB. QUINN % ^ $ ^ S ^ c }
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE^;V^4>*
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order to the following, this,

L. Rich Humpherys
Karra J. Porter
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Ste. 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Matthew L. Lalli
Troy L. Booher
M. Lane Molen
SNELL Sc WILMER, L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Ste. 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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.day of January, 2 010:

FlUOOISTWCTCOUiT
T

Matthew L. Lalli (6105)
Troy L.Booher (9419)
M. Lane Molen (11724)
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801-257-1900
Facsimile: 801-257-1800

»<rd Judicial District

SALfUKE COUNTY
•puty Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant Safeco Insurance Company ofAmerica
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STONE FLOOD AND FIRE
RESTORATION, INC., JAMES K.
STONE AND PATRICE STONE,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND DISMISSING
ALL REMAINING CLAIMS

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 070907640
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,

Honorable Anthony Quinn

Defendant.

On February 5, 2010, the court heard arguments on plaintiffs Stone Flood and Fire
Restoration Inc., James Stone, and Patrice Stone's motion to reconsider the court's November 3,
2009 order granting in part and denying in party defendant's motion for summary judgment. At
the hearings, defendant Safeco Insurance Company of America was represented by Matthew
Lalli and Troy Booher, and plaintiffs were represented by Rich Humpherys. After having
reviewed the written submissions and having heard oral argument, and for good cause, the court

grants the motion to reconsider and, for reasons set forth more fully in the court's tentative ruling
dated January 26, 2010 and order dated November 3, 2009, rules as follows.
The court exercises its discretion to reconsider its prior ruling on Safeco's motion for
summary judgment.

THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
Safeco's motion for summary judgment is hereby reconsidered and granted in full. All
claims are dismissed with prejudice. This constitutes the final judgment of the court.
DATED this 5th day of February, 20&£
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